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Abstract
This article uses the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a jumping-off point for a broader,
preliminary reflection on the continuing evolution of war in the digital age. It is the contention
here that we are witnessing an emergent phenomenon of what we might call csywar.
Intervening states engaged in csywar—best understood as an indirect, hybrid strategy—seek
to attain data, infrastructural, and epistemic dominance over the target state. This article
discusses various defensive counter-csywar strategies that target states could pursue, such as
fostering data, infrastructural, and epistemic resilience internally, and makes the case for
developing deterrent counter-csywar capabilities against hostile intervening states.
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On February 24, 2022, Russia embarked on a “special military operation,” seeking the
“demilitarization and denazification” of neighboring Ukraine. Russian president Vladimir
Putin claimed that he wanted to “to protect people who have been subjected to bullying and
genocide . . . for the last eight years.” The Ukrainian government quickly dismissed Putin’s
justification as a pretext.1 Thoughtful observers agree that Putin’s real aim is to re-establish a
secure sphere of influence and a Greater Russian “civilizational space” that last existed during
the Cold War, covering a region including not merely Russia but “also the Balkans, Ukraine—
the historical point of origin for Russian civilization”—and “anywhere Orthodox Christianity
is practised or Russian is spoken.” 2 In this respect, the Ukrainian government’s obvious
attempts to seek a closer geopolitical, military, and economic alignment with the West, against
the wider context of creeping NATO expansion eastward since the end of the Soviet empire in
1991, was likely adjudged by Putin to be simply unacceptable.3
To be sure, the international community has been responding to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine with great energy and resolve. So far diplomatic attempts involving multiple
governments and international bodies to resolve the conflict between Kyiv and Moscow;
indirect military support provided principally through supply of weaponry to the Ukrainian
armed forces; heavy and punitive economic sanctions on Russian governmental, business, and
commercial entities; and a concerted online information effort to debunk Russian justifications
for the invasion have all been employed to isolate the Kremlin, compel it to cease its attacks,
and restore the status quo ante.4
This article does not seek to add to the already voluminous and rapidly growing analyses
of the conflict in Ukraine. Rather, it uses the conflict as a jumping-off point for a broader,
preliminary reflection on the continuing evolution of war in the digital age. It is the contention
here that at a grand strategic level of analysis, we are witnessing an emergent phenomenon of
what we might call csywar.5 Carl von Clausewitz’s classic nineteenth-century statement still
holds: “War is politics by other means.”6 That is, war is an instrument an intervening state uses
to impose its political will on a target state, to change the latter’s behavior in ways that advance
the interests of the former. Traditionally, kinetic war has been a means of last resort. As
evidenced in the Western response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the instruments of state
power have represented a spectrum of influence involving diplomacy, military force, strategic
information operations, and economic policy, including sanctions. In the US context, this idea
of a spectrum of power has for many years been encapsulated relatively parsimoniously in the
acronym DIME, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.7
As the US military’s 2018 Joint Doctrine Note explains, the “essence” of the diplomatic
instrument is “engagement—how a nation interacts with state or non-state actors, generally to
secure some form of agreement that allows the conflicting parties to coexist peacefully.” The
informational instrument is about “creating, exploiting, and disrupting knowledge” with a view
to enjoying “an information advantage over another party.” The military instrument can entail
“applying force, threatening the application of force, or enabling other parties to apply force in
furtherance of strategic ends.” Finally, the economic instrument “focuses on furthering or
constraining others’ prosperity.”8
While the DIME concept appears to suggest that all four instruments—diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic—are of equal importance in national strategy, military
theorists have qualified such musings. The eminent military officer and strategic theorist André
Beaufre (1902–1975), for instance, distinguishes between direct and indirect strategy.
Beaufre classifies these two modes of what he calls “total strategy” “according to the role
played by force, ranging from the most insidious to the most violent methods.” In “the
direct mode military strategy plays a preponderant role; in the indirect mode military force
plays a secondary role.” Total strategy, according to Beaufre, is “at the top of the strategy

2

New England Journal of Public Policy
pyramid and is under the direct control of the government,” which “decides how all other
strategies are coordinated and employed.”9
Following Beaufre, the state will have to assess the strategic threat posed by an
adversary and decide the optimal mix of the four elements of DIME within a total strategic
response: if a direct application of DIME were decided upon, then the military instrument
would be preponderant, with the other instruments in support. Conversely, if an indirect
application of DIME was the approach selected then, the nonkinetic instruments—
diplomatic, economic, and informational—would be preponderant in the total strategic
response, with the military instrument playing a calibrated supporting role. Beaufre
observed that in the Cold War (1945–1990) environment of “nuclear or political
deterrence,” the “indirect strategy . . . [was] very important and not the direct strategy’s
adoption of material force.”10 Putin’s actions in his Ukrainian adventure in February 2022
seems to be a departure from his normal indirect-strategy playbook, in which the military
instrument is limited and closely coordinated with diplomatic and informational elements,
as in his annexation of Crimea in 2014. 11 In the current undertaking, he appears to be banking
on a direct strategy, in which brute military force is the decisive instrument to enable him to
attain his geopolitical objectives in Ukraine.12

Importance of Indirect Strategy
Since the 1990s, we have witnessed rapid advances in computing power and communication
technology, resulting in the rise of the Internet, cheap broadband access, and inexpensive
smartphones. With the explosion of social media platforms since the mid-2000s, we are in a
position to tweak Beaufre’s total strategy ideas, averring that in the contemporary era, indirect
strategy is on the ascendant. Employing an indirect strategy, an idea with roots in classical
sources much older than Beaufre’s treatises, such as the work of the fifth-century BCE Chinese
strategist Sun Tzu, essentially involves avoiding the enemy’s strength and attacking his
weakness instead.13 The best strategy, according to Sun Tzu, is to “win without fighting.”14 In
other words, the ability of one’s adversaries to impose their will on us without relying
excessively on military power represents the “acme of skill.”15 This basic concept of avoiding
strength and attacking weakness sums up efforts by some contemporary observers to explain
how, over the past decade, the nonkinetic elements of the DIME model deployed by adversaries
have played major roles in undermining the West. For instance, John Carlin argues that the
expansion of Internet connectivity “makes our critical infrastructure—water, electricity,
communications, banking—and our most private information more vulnerable.”16 He asserts
that rather than a cold war, we are now in a “code war,” in which “evolving adversaries,”
ranging from “nation-states, terrorists, criminals, [and] hacktivists” to “single individuals
seeking fun, profit, or destruction” could mount devastating cyberattacks that—bypassing the
massed strength of a state’s conventional armed forces—could directly strike its vulnerable,
digitally interconnected homeland and cripple it.17
In a related vein, Jacob Helberg argues that we are engaged in a “gray war,” in which states
like Russia, Iran, and especially China are sidestepping Western military might, seeking digital
technologies to “access, delete, and manipulate data” crucial to Western states by gaining
greater control of the backend architecture of the global Internet.18 Calling data the “new oil”
and information the “most contested geopolitical resource” sought after by many states,
Helberg argues that the “strategic significance of data and information is increasingly
stretching beyond the realm of intelligence collection and into the realm of political influence
and control.”19 In short, with control of the core layer of the Internet, “you control everything”
and can impose your will on the West without resort to costly armed conflict.20 Peter Singer
and Emerson T. Brooking make a broadly similar argument in their book LikeWar. Focusing
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on the weaponization of social media, they point out that intervening states, by learning how
“to command and manipulate” opinion in target states, could foster “political and social
polarization” within the latter, rendering them strategically impotent—again without a shot
being fired. 21 A former senior military officer and national security adviser to former US
president Donald Trump, H. R. McMaster in this respect has argued that Russia under Putin
has engaged in “new-generation warfare” with a view to “disrupt, divide and weaken societies”
he regards as “competitors.”22
Russian new-generation warfare—also known as the Gerasimov doctrine after the Russian
general who is associated with these ideas 23 —as well as a Chinese version called “three
warfares,” that is, “psychological warfare, public opinion warfare and legal warfare
(‘lawfare’)”24—are also referred to as hybrid warfare.25 There are several definitions of the
concept. A 2010 US Army training document describes it as “the diverse and dynamic
combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve
mutually benefitting effects.”26 According to an article in the NATO Review: “Hybrid warfare
entails an interplay or fusion of conventional as well as unconventional instruments of power
and tools of subversion. These instruments or tools are blended in a synchronised manner to
exploit the vulnerabilities of an antagonist and achieve synergistic effects.”27 In a similar vein,
the European Union and NATO define hybrid warfare as “the methods and tools used by
individual state or non-state actors to enhance their own interests, strategies and goals,”
spanning the continuum from “disinformation to disruption of energy supplies, cyber war, and
traditional warfare.”28 A key feature of the indirect strategy of hybrid warfare is that it “has
blurred the line between peace and war.” 29 Analysts have argued that the “internet has
delivered nations—and non-nation groups—the ability to engage in actions that appear to step
well past the line of peace but fall short of actual war.”30 As the US strategic analyst Sean
McFate argues, in the current era there “is no such thing as war or peace—both co-exist,
always.”31
Against the foregoing backdrop, the concept of csywar offers one more preliminary
perspective to the growing discourse on the evolving nature of war. It is suggested here that an
intervening state engaged in csywar is applying indirect strategy in a hybrid multidimensional
fashion. More precisely, in csywar, as we shall see, the intervening state engages in and often
integrates assaults on data, infrastructural, and epistemic domains within the target state with
one strategic aim: to enable the intervening state to impose its will on the target state. The
distinctive feature of the indirect strategy of csywar is that in targeting two of the three targetstate domains (data and epistemic), it emphasizes the informational instrument of the standard
DIME model. In addition, as we shall see, intervening-state domination of a target state’s
infrastructural domain can have broader information implications as well. Thus, csywar can be
regarded as an indirect strategy of hybrid warfare that prioritizes the application of
informational elements of power in the attempt to dominate a target state. That objective is
achieved by capturing command of what we may call csywarspace.

Command of Csywarspace: Data, Infrastructural, and Epistemic
Dominance
In previous military-technological eras, strategic theorists offered varying assessments of what
were the strategic requirements for success in war. While in the nineteenth century Alfred
Mahan talked about command of the sea, twentieth-century airpower theorists such as Giulio
Douhet promoted command of the air, while the geographer Halford Mackinder proclaimed
that whoever commanded the Eurasian “heartland” would control the world.32 In the emerging
csywar era, however, it is suggested that the strategic aim is to secure command of
csywarspace. Command of csywarspace is expressed through data, infrastructural, and
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epistemic dominance. Data dominance is attained when the intervening state secures relatively
unfettered access to confidential public- and private-sector data repositories within the target
state, including proprietary information with strategic economic value as well as militarytechnical secrets. The mining of hacked target-state proprietary data could enable the
intervening-state private sector and industrial base to rapidly advance up the technological
value chain—without needing to invest the high levels of resources that drove technical
innovation by target-state private industry in the first place. This intervening-state-abetted
economic espionage could shift the technological, military, and geopolitical balance to the
detriment of the target state.33 In 2010, for instance, the Chinese government was accused of
stealing the source code—“the secret back-end recipe for how a website works”—for at least
thirty-three US firms, including Google, Yahoo, Symantec, Northrop Grumman, and Dow
Chemical, through cyber hacking activities.34 Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law,
the government can legally require its citizens working in target-state government,
technological, and industrial sectors to “acquire data, plans, intellectual property—anything,
really—from anyone, anywhere” in a “whatever it takes” approach to become a global leader
in cutting edge industries.35
For infrastructural dominance, it is postulated that there are minimalist and maximalist
scenarios. In the minimalist scenario, the intervening state seeks the unbridled ability to
dominate and disrupt the normal functioning of critical target-state infrastructure, such as the
Internet, energy, water, and air traffic control systems at will, by distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks. For instance, when Russian forces invaded the Republic of Georgia in 2008,
Georgian websites were hit by botnet-mounted DDoS attacks in one of the earliest examples
of hybrid warfare. 36 This massive cyberattack not only “brought down key government
websites,” it deprived the Georgian authorities of the ability to communicate with the outside
world.37 The maximalist understanding of infrastructural dominance is more worrisome: in
essence it involves domination of the world’s manufacturing base and supply chains. As of
2015, China produced “28 percent of the world’s cars, 41 percent of its ships, more than 60
percent of TVs,” and amazingly, “90 percent of the world’s mobile phones,” while producing
half of the world’s printed circuit boards—integral to practically all electronic devices.38 One
result of this dominance is the “shocking” extent to which the US military is reliant on “Chinese
production”; for instance, US missiles depend on Chinese propellant and US night-vision
goggles depend on Chinese specialty metals.39
In addition, it has been estimated that as of 2019 China owned 90–95 percent of so-called
rare-earth metals, such as dyprosium, neodymium, and gadolinium—critical to the production
of “everything from smartphones to hard drives to radar and advanced weapons systems.”40
Another highly significant example of the maximalist goal of infrastructural dominance is
China’s quest to dominate the backend architecture of the Internet: by 2020, Huawei
“controlled approximately 30 percent of the global market share in telecommunications
equipment,” while making “tremendous progress toward its goal to dominate the emerging
market in fifth-generation communications networks.”41 These networks, known as 5G, which
are a hundred times faster than 4G in speed of information transfer, are potentially
transformative in the context of the rapidly emerging global Internet of Things—“the vaguely
defined network of millions of internet-linked devices.”42 But it also means that an interveningstate-linked telecommunications firm that “builds and controls a nation’s 5G network” will
have little trouble “stealing and mining all the data on that network: all the academic papers
and research, all engineering and business plans, all the photos, emails, and text messages.”43
Thus, maximalist infrastructural dominance opens the door to structural data dominance. In
addition, and more ominously, the intervening state could potentially “weaponize” the 5G
technology “that is managed by that network” by, for instance, directing self-driving cars into
crowds or flying drones into the flight path of commercial aircraft.44
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The third element of command of csywarspace, epistemic dominance, reaffirms the central
importance of the strategic informational thrust of csywar. To achieve epistemic dominance
over a target state, an intervening state seeks to shape and mold the perceptions and ultimately
the master narrative adhered to by the target-state leadership and its public by ensuring that
various combinations of manipulated disinformation and false narratives dominate target-state
sociopolitical discourse. With such control of mass attention and sentiment, intervening-state
actors can sow confusion and discord between the target state and its public or between
different segments of the public. For instance, Russian state propaganda organs such as RT and
Sputnik have been described as akin to a “firehose of falsehood” that aims to “disrupt, divide,
and weaken societies” that Moscow sees as “competitors.”45
Achieving epistemic dominance would enable the intervening state to secure political
outcomes within the target state favorable to it or even to undermine target-state social and
political cohesion. The criticality of epistemic dominance is best illustrated by the concept of
the OODA loop developed by the US Air Force officer John Boyd: observe, orient, decide,
act.46 Boyd argues that in interstate geopolitical and strategic contestation, those states that can
clearly observe the strategic environment, orient themselves rapidly and accurately to that
environment, and efficiently and effectively decide on a course of action and execute it
expeditiously would be able to gain a strategic advantage over their adversaries. Boyd argues
that states and militaries with tighter OODA loops would be able to outmaneuver adversaries
with looser, more dilatory OODA cycles.47
Boyd’s OODA loop is relevant for the current discussion. If an intervening state is able—
through intensive disinformation and false narrative campaigns—to prevent target-state
communities from accurately observing and orienting to ground reality, then their decision
making and ensuing actions are likely to produce outcomes favorable only to the intervening
state, such as lopsided election results and even sociopolitical unrest. Hence, it is important for
target states to foster what could be termed observational and orientational accuracy. That is,
target-state constituencies—despite a deluge of intervening-state-sponsored online and offline
disinformation and biased narratives—must be able to retain an accurate observation of and
orientation to ground reality. Failure to do so would risk the target-state society’s splitting and
polarizing into “alternate realities” in which “groups of like-minded people clump together,”
growing to “resemble fanatical tribes, trapped in echo chambers of their own design.”48
In this respect, it is likely that Russian efforts to achieve epistemic dominance by
destroying the observational and orientational accuracy of the relevant populations and
segmenting them into polarized echo chambers played a key role during the 2016 US
presidential elections that led to the election of the pro-Putin candidate Donald Trump as well
as in the historic Brexit decision in the United Kingdom—which also served Moscow’s
geopolitical objective of weakening the democratic European Union.49 A society clinging to
robust observational and orientational accuracy—despite intensive adversarial disinformation
and polarization efforts—is thus at the core of target-state attempts to foster epistemic
resilience.

Countering Csywar: Fostering Data, Infrastructural, and Epistemic
Resilience
To combat intervening-state csywar efforts to secure data, infrastructural, and epistemic
dominance, target-state public and private sector stakeholders must develop a broader
understanding of what amounts to “critical infrastructure” in the csywar age. While countries
have fretted about a “cyber Pearl Harbor” for years, most analysts have narrowly framed this
potential as a “devastating attack on our nation’s critical infrastructure,” such as “our power
grid, on our water supply, on hospitals, or on our air traffic control computers.”50 But in 2016,
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Russia, as John Carlin argues, attacked another sort of critical infrastructure: “America’s
confidence in America.”51 Moreover, when North Korean elements in late 2014 hacked Sony
Pictures’ confidential personnel database to deter the studio from releasing a comedy about a
plot to kill its leader, what seemed at first to be a large data breach soon became something
more insidious: shaken Sony Pictures employees were also threatened that if they did not speak
out against their company they and their families would be harmed as well, because the hackers
had accessed their home addresses and other personal information. 52 Intervening-state data
dominance could thus enable it to sow confusion and fear within the target state as well. The
counter-csywar challenge must thus be framed as broadly as possible. One relatively broad yet
parsimonious understanding of the counter-csywar challenge is to frame it as an exercise in
building data, infrastructural, and epistemic resilience.
Resilience refers to the ability of actors to safeguard themselves and if necessary bounce
back rapidly from unexpected systemic shocks. 53 In our terms, data resilience refers to the
ability of public- and private-data owners to protect proprietary information from cyber hacks
and theft of intellectual property or to quickly respond to such losses optimally with minimal
disruption to their overall functions. Data resilience can be built into target-state institutional
cultures by encouraging good habits of individual cyber hygiene. As John Carlin observes,
even the most damaging cyber hacks of sensitive data have come through “relatively
unsophisticated means exploiting obvious vulnerabilities,” including “human frailties, laziness
and predictable behaviors”—such as “software patches that haven’t been installed, weak or
default passwords protecting sensitive data, or ‘phishing’ techniques where a user has clicked
a nefarious link in an email and allowed hackers access to an account.”54 Even information on
one’s LinkedIn and Facebook pages can be weaponized by intervening-state-linked hackers:
an employee at an US “midsized tech company” received an email newsletter from what
appeared to be his favorite sports team but was actually a state-sponsored phishing attack that
enabled the introduction of a “malicious code that opened a path the company’s computer
system” and gave the hackers “access to corporate plans, emails, technical specs.”55
Good cyber hygiene habits that can be encouraged through workshops and continuing
education programs are the basic building blocks of effective target-state data resilience.56 At
the same time, effective business continuity plans to respond systematically and optimally to
sensitive data breaches are important countermeasures as well.57 For instance, Estonia’s current
robust cybersecurity strategy involves emphasizing “end-to-end encryption and two-factor
authentication,” public-private sector partnerships, “high-functioning e-government
infrastructure, digital identity, mandatory security baselines, and a central system for
identifying and responding to attacks.”58
Minimally, infrastructural resilience refers to the ability of public and private entities to
protect critical infrastructure networks, such as national power, water supply, and
transportation grids, from attempts by malign intervening states to disrupt them and, failing
that, to bounce back quickly from such attacks. In a sense, good cyber hygiene and realistic
business continuity planning, as described earlier, works well for not just data but also
minimalist infrastructural resilience. Maximally, building longer-term infrastructural
resilience, in essence, involves reducing over-reliance on intervening-state production-andsupply chain and telecommunications networks for critical target-state national security
requirements. For instance, in 2019, when it became clear that “Chinese communications
infrastructure combined with a sustained cyber-espionage campaign” threatened target-state
national security, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan “banned
Huawei from their networks and urged others to follow suit.”59 At the same time, because of
the importance of 5G to “every aspect of citizens’ personal lives, corporate world, national
infrastructure transportation, health, and national defense,” some observers argue that
multinational collaboration is needed to develop trusted 5G telecommunications that can
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“protect sensitive and proprietary data.”60 Jacob Helberg adds that the US Congress should
authorize a National Advanced Manufacturing Strategy to reduce US “dependence on Chinese
supply chains and revitalize American manufacturing,” especially in the areas of
“semiconductors” and “high-performing microchips, which are used in “everything from
artificial intelligence to cell phones.”61 He calls for more systematic government scrutiny of
“which high-tech and vital goods must be produced domestically, which can be safely sourced
from an Allied Industrial and Innovation Base, and which goods can still be imported” from
more general sources.62
Finally, epistemic resilience in the current analysis refers to the ability of target-state
stakeholders to cope effectively with intervening-state-supported online and offline
disinformation campaigns, in the process ensuring that the body politic retains access to
objective information and relatively unbiased narratives that are largely reflective of reality—
thus preserving their collective observational and orientational accuracy.
Observational accuracy can be enhanced by rapidly calling out online disinformation when
it appears. In Singapore, for instance, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and
Manipulations Act (POFMA), passed in June 2019, “helps protect the Singapore public against
online harm by countering the proliferation of online falsehoods,” through “correction
directions which require recipients to insert a notice against the original post, with a link to the
Government’s clarification.” The idea is that the “clarification sets out the falsehoods and facts
for the public to examine, without the original post being removed,” so that readers “can read
both the original post and the facts, and decide for themselves what is the truth.”63 Germany,
France, and Thailand have also introduced legislation that grants “authorities more executive
power to deter fake news, allowing them to force social media platforms, websites, and
publishers to remove false content.”64 As Nina Jankowicz points out, however, “decades of
political science and psychological research” suggest that laws that mandate “fact checks” may
“not only fail to correct falsehoods, they often cause individuals to double down on incorrect
information.”65 In addition, disinformation disseminated through encrypted messaging apps
that cannot be openly tracked cannot be debunked: “Fact-checking can’t help us dispel claims
made in private fora.”66
The preceding analysis compels some analysts to argue with Singer and Brooking that the
key really is “information literacy,” which should be inculcated from childhood on and is “no
longer merely an education issue but a national security imperative.” 67 The University of
Washington, for instance, runs courses on “advanced critical thinking in media consumption,”
such as the colorfully titled “Calling Bullshit: Data Reasoning in a Digital World.” 68 In
Ukraine, an American NGO called IREX has collaborated with the Academy of Ukrainian
Press and the fact-checking entity StopFake to run an information literacy-promoting
curriculum called “Learn to Discern.” The curriculum is described as more practical than
academic and trains media consumers to “recognize emotional manipulation”—a technique
used by “purveyors of disinformation from Russia and beyond”—so that they can “read news
more critically.”69
The “Learn to Discern” program has produced results: trained consumers have engaged in
“cross-checking multiple news sources” and have shown “sophisticated knowledge of the news
industry.” 70 Similarly, Finland—long targeted by propaganda from neighboring Russia—
emphasizes critical thinking skills in the education system beginning in the early grades, to the
extent that “Finns rank at the top of all Europeans in their ability to resist fake news.”71 At the
same time, in an effort to thwart the formation of online echo chambers, a US start-up called
Soap AI has designed a “machine learning platform that allows users to understand better what
is happening in the world by accessing verified sources of information, reducing the clutter
associated with clickbait, and ensuring access to a range of perspectives.” In short, the Soap
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platform “presents multiple opinions on an event or story so readers can make their own
judgments based on correct information.”72
Attaining epistemic resilience in the target-state body politic also depends, as John Boyd
suggests, on orientational accuracy. That is, what attitudes and worldview would the
community adopt toward incoming news and information after the observation phase? The
answer to this question is important because orientation, as noted, would impact the decision
and action phases. In his OODA loop model, Boyd points out that orientation is affected not
just by incoming information but also by “previous experience,” “cultural traditions,” and
prevailing “analyses and synthesis.”73 For this reason, observational accuracy is not enough:
even if disinformation and false narratives have been largely filtered out in the observational
phase, orientational accuracy can still be impacted by extant sociopolitical fault-lines that can
be weaponized by intervening-state organs. As Jankowicz points out, from the Russian
perspective, in Estonia such weaknesses included “ethnic tensions and historical revisionism”;
in Georgia, “culture and religion”; in Poland, “political polarization”; and in the Czech
Republic, “anti-migrant sentiment.” 74 She observes—wisely—that “unless we mitigate our
own political polarization, our own internal issues, we will continue to be an easy target for
any malign actor” to attack—with consequences for target-state political and social cohesion.75

Responding to Csywar: Are We Ready?
The emergent indirect hybrid strategy of csywar, in which an adversarial intervening state seeks
to bypass a target state’s strengths and hammer away at its internal weaknesses by attaining
data, infrastructural, and epistemic dominance may well reflect an inflection point in the
continuing evolution of warfare. There have been similar inflection points in the past. While
strategic theorists such as Clausewitz and Antoine Henri Jomini earned acclaim for explaining
the new European age of Napoleonic destructive mass warfare in the early nineteenth century,76
a century later, nuclear strategists such as Bernard Brodie arrived at the paradoxical analysis
that the overriding value of atomic weapons was to flaunt them but never use them.77 A new
generation of strategic analysts is now trying to come to grips with what has been called
“likewar,” “gray war,” and “code war.” In this article I have suggested another hopefully useful
term to add to the growing literature on hybrid warfare: csywar.
The current Russian invasion in Ukraine may well signify the beginning of a wider
geopolitical conflict between a US-led Western liberal democratic bloc and an authoritarian
axis involving Russia and China and its allies—a new cold war based on csywar principles.
After all, in 2019 Putin declared that “liberalism” had “become obsolete,” 78 while he and
Chinese president Xi Jinping proclaimed in early February 2022 that their strategic partnership
had “no limits”—though the veracity of that assertion is currently being tested in the current
conflict in Ukraine.79
While countering intervening-state csywar campaigns by fostering data, infrastructural,
and epistemic resilience is important, these measures are strategically defensive. It may well
be important for the international community of democratic states also to consider deterrent
counter-csywar measures. Just as mutual nuclear deterrence kept the Cold War from getting
hot, national target-state capabilities to deter aggressive intervening states are needed to help
preserve the integrity of target-state csywarspace. In this regard, democratic target-state policy
and strategic elites must ask whether they possess realistic response options short of military
force, ranging from legal and diplomatic challenges and economic sanctions to credible cyber
and informational offensive capabilities—singly or in coordination with allies—that
potentially aggressive intervening states must take into account and may well encourage the
latter to commit to more reasonable overall behavior.80
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Three points can be made in this regard. First, target states seeking to deter and if necessary
respond more assertively to csywar attacks should be clear about what the threshold for an
attack in csywarspace triggering counter-csywar measures looks like. As Helberg puts it, in the
Cold War, “threats came by way of intercontinental missiles,” but today “the new ICBM is an
IBM.”81 Target states should thus develop a counter-csywar doctrine that specifies a range of
responses to intervening states “proportionate to the scale and effect of the initial assault.”82
Second, an offensive plank of a target state’s counter-csywar strategy should also include
active deterrence of intervening states by the credible threat of highly effective target-statemounted epistemic dominance campaigns capable of undermining the domestic and
geopolitical standing of rogue intervening-state regimes. For instance, because of the current
travails of the Russian invasion force in Ukraine, the international, economic, and domestic
political fallout of Western sanctions—on top of Putin’s very real domestic weaknesses—there
is seems to be ample scope for target-state strategic communities to beat the Russians at their
own game, though in this instance, “truth and transparency” would be “important offensive as
well as defensive weapons to defeat the Kremlin’s use of lies and obfuscation.”83
Finally, depending on how the post–Ukraine conflict geopolitical landscape pans out, an
effective coordinated democratic state total strategy for international stability may require the
creation of a democratic “techno-bloc of nations” based on “Internet infrastructure free of
authoritarian influence,” to strike a new global balance of power with an emergent authoritarian
techno-bloc led by China and Russia.84 In sum, the burning question is clear: Are we ready to
respond to the emergent Age of Csywar?
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